nized him more. When I tried to say that the higher levels could override lower ones, but slowly ("it might take seconds," I said, thinking this was slow) he was incredulous that anyone would care. "If it's so fast," he said, "then what do you need those lower levels for?" "It's not a matter of need," I tried to explain, "they are there through evolution. They're part of the mechanism for making rapid assessments of safe or dangerous, good or bad. " "So what?" he countered. "That's just your opinion. If the change is so fast, then so what?"
We spoke different languages. He argued from literary and historical analyses. I argued from psychological theory. I finally retreated, dejected.
From such debates, and I have taken part in many, I have experienced what Snow (1993) called "the two cultures." Snow first made his argument in 1959 but the point still applies today. One culture is that of humanity and literature, the other is the culture of science. Each has much to offer the other, if only the communication gap could be traversed. The conflicting, contradictory, argumentative views have merit. Teasing them apart, though, is not for the faint of heart.
We all agree that beauty is important to our lives-beauty, pleasure, and fun. But that's where the agreement stops, because trying to define these elusive concepts gets us entangled in centuries of debate about the nature of these concepts; a debate that mixes up different issues, that cuts across world views and disciplines, that uses different terminology to describe the same phenomena, or the same terminology to describe wholly different phenomena, that pits the precise measurement of the scientist against the artist or humanist who believes measurement is impossible and irrelevant. I suspect the major difficulty with my conversation was the use of the word beauty. Suppose I had described the output of the visceral stage in terms of positive or negative valence rather than beauty. Would this have solved the communication problem? It's too late to try but I suspect not. I'll return to this issue later.
If beauty, pleasure, and fun are so essential to our lives, so essential to the design of products and services, then we had better come to understand these concepts. It is not enough that we build products that function, that are understandable and usable, we also need to build products that bring joy and excitement, pleasure and fun, and, yes, beauty to people's lives.
The field of human-computer interaction (HCI) has long stressed interaction, but primarily through the study of the effectiveness of various means of constructing systems for a wide variety of activities and situations. Effectiveness has been measured by such items as usability, understanding, the number of errors, and the amount of time required to complete a task. Now, as our field matures, it is time to move toward the emotional and aesthetic side of interaction. Although usability and understandability are never goals, they are means toward the goal. Pleasure, enjoyment, fun, however, can be goals.
In recent years, there has been an increasing number of studies of fun, pleasure, and emotion in the development of computer systems. Indeed, there are now conferences and books on design, emotions, pleasure, and funology but this is still a nascent science. Much remains to be learned. Moreover, we have no standard body of terminology, theory, or method.
Therefore, it was when I was asked to act as action editor for an article by Marc Hassenzahl (this issue), originally entitled "Things That Make Me Shine: The Beauty in Interactive Products," I jumped at the chance. I did the usual things an editor does: read the article carefully and send it to a group of carefully selected reviewers. When I received the reviews back, I was pleasantly surprised by the resulting discussion. I thought the debate generated by the reviewers as interesting as the article itself. Therefore, after discussion with Tom Moran, Editor of HCI; the reviewers; and the author, we decided to publish the debate as a special section of the journal. This special section consists of this introduction, the revised article (now renamed "The Interplay of Beauty, Goodness and Usability in Interactive Products"), comments by each of the four reviewers, and a final word by the author.
Let me review the debate. In 1997 and 2000, Noam Tractinsky and his collaborators published a pair of articles on the relationship between aesthetics and usability. The latter article had the strong and provocative title "What is Beautiful is Usable" (Tractinsky, Shoval-Katz, & Ikar, 2000) . These articles were the starting point for Marc Hassenzahl's work. At one level, his results contradicted those of Tractinsky, for he found no relationship between judgments of aesthetic quality and the usability of the music players in his study. But at another level, his work supported that of Tractinsky, for he did find that the aesthetically pleasing players were judged to be better than the less pleasing ones, even if they were equally easy to use. The difference, says Hassenzahl, is not in beauty but rather in goodness.
Aha! We now have another dimension to consider: usability, beauty, and goodness. I was intrigued by this interpretation, for I thought it added to our understanding. It was difficult to see why formal usability would change with the aesthetics of a product but, goodness, now that is a different matter. That made great sense to me: People's judgment of overall goodness might very well be affected by aesthetic pleasure.
Hassenzahl's conclusion is very tantalizing. Goodness, he suggests, results from combining impressions of hedonic identification, pragmatic values (e.g., perceived usability), and mental effort (which comes from actual usability). Beauty, on the other hand, is solely influenced by hedonic identification. However, before we can accept this analysis, a number of questions arise. What do we mean by beauty? Goodness? How do we measure these things? Also, what kind of methods do we need to use to do these studies, for beauty and goodness are not so easy to measure as usability.
In his discussion of Hassenzahl's article, Noam Tractinsky (this issue) accepts the theme of the article-that of re-evaluating the study of beauty and HCI-but suggests that much more discussion and research is still needed. Tractinsky agrees that the bold title of his earlier work, "What is Beautiful is Usable," overstates the case but points out differences between some of his more recent experiments and the work being discussed here. The issues may be methodological, they may be definitional, or they may reflect the different kinds of systems under study. Regardless of which turn out to be relevant, the discussion started here is bound to enhance the entire field's understanding of these important issues.
Indeed, David Frohlich (this issue) uses the article as a starting point for a reflection on the nature of beauty. In a private note, he told me that he was reviewing the last 2,500 years of writings on the topic and his short commentary starts in the year 6 BC and Pythagoras. Beauty is an elusive construct, with early thinkers believing it resided in the object itself, a view that contrasts with Kant's view (in 1750) that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. Beauty, moreover, may correspond to multiple aspects of a person's response to the sight, use, and contemplation of an object or scene.
My own work becomes relevant here (Norman 2004; Norman & Ortony, 2003; Ortony, Norman, & Revelle, 2005) . We defined three levels of processing and, as I described at the start of this note, this gives rise to three different levels of beauty: two being subconscious and only one conscious. The visceral level is perceptually based, given rise to immediate judgments: good or bad, safe or dangerous. This level is biologically determined, with only minor adaptation or classical conditioning possible (in other words, minimal learning). If there is any level at which beauty is associated with the object itself, it is at the visceral level, for we have evolved to judge some objects or experiences positively, others negatively. This, however, is a beauty that is truly only skin deep, for at this level of processing, it is only what can be immediately perceived that matters: the only processing possible is simple pattern recognition through innate mechanisms.
The behavioral level, we argued, is expectation driven, so positive affect results from feeling in control, from understanding during the use of a product. Lack of control and mismatch between expectations and actual experiences produces negative affect. The behavioral level is the home of highly learned skills. Both the visceral and behavioral levels are subconscious, producing feelings but not true emotions. Most discussions of beauty focus upon either surface appearances (visceral) or deep, hidden meaning (reflective). Few accounts talk of behavioral beauty or pleasure, of the pleasure of the smooth responses of a well-crafted mechanism, or the anxiety when one feels out of control. Although behavioral responses are an important part of our subjective experiences, so this remains a topic in great need of further research.
It is only at the reflective level that full-fledged emotions reside. This level is intellectually driven. It is conscious and aware of emotional feelings. Moreover, it uses the rich history of prior experiences, one's own self-image, and personal meanings to evaluate any experience.
Thus, my disagreement with the art historian was over the role of visceral beauty-a concept he denied. To me, many of the debates are between beauty at the visceral and reflective levels. Visceral responses reflect superficial or surface judgments. Reflective levels provide deep and considered judgments and even superficially ugly items might be judged beautiful. Indeed, many of the discussions reflect these tensions. Frohlich (this issue) seems to agree and his article adds to the depth of understanding of the issues relevant to the designer. Do note, however, that Hassenzahl (this issue), in his reply to the reviewers ("Beautiful Objects as an Extension of the Self"), voices specific disagreement. Yes, he says, there probably is an immediate, automatic visceral response but why is this equated with beauty? "They are simply too diffuse," he concludes. And maybe this is where one source of disagreement lies: in our terminology. After all, if beauty is a conscious judgment, how can we claim this judgment to derive from automatic, subconscious visceral processing?
As I remarked at the beginning of this article, perhaps the term beauty should be restricted to conscious, reflective judgments. At the visceral level, there can be only positive and negative valences and these can only be assessed through physiological measurements. Any spoken or conscious assessment of visceral responses must come from the reflective level, which means it has been subjected to possible interpretation, modification, and rationalization. Yes, visceral and behavioral levels contribute to our perception of beauty and goodness but they can be perceived only after interpretation by the reflective level.
What parts of these studies are relevant to designers? This is the question raised by the commentary of Kees Overbeeke and Stephan Wensveen (this issue). How might the results apply to a physical, tangible product rather than the more abstract, virtual control system of the screen-based music player? We are product designers, they say, and we are impatient: "How can we use results such as those by Hassenzahl to make things now?" And, as an example of the role that emotional state might play in a physical product, they describe an alarm clock, designed by Wensveen, in which the alarm time is set by adjusting twelve knobs into whatever pattern suits the mood of the person.
Setting a clock in such a way as to reflect one's emotional state is a novel and intriguing concept. Although the use of 12 sliders to set an alarm time seems daunting, in fact, when I tried it during a visit to Eindhoven, I found it both easy and fun. The alarm setting is continually visible on a digital display, varying naturally as the sliders are adjusted, and it feels quite natural to set a calm, relaxed pattern of sliders to represent a calm, relaxed mood or a jagged setting to represent an agitated one, both leading to the same setting of the alarm (see Figure 1 of Overbeeke and Wensveen; this issue). Overbeeke and Wensveen have demonstrated that people can readily use the sliders to reflect their emotional states. (Mind you, these are the states at the time of setting the alarm, which are likely to be very different from those at the time of awakening.)
To the experimental psychologist, Hassenzahl's (this issue) article has several problematic areas. This is only to be expected, because work in aesthetics is fraught with difficulties. Moreover, Hassenzahl was limited in his choice of experimental material. I thought his choice particularly clever: Taking a standard music player available freely on the internet (the Sonique media player) and looking at the variety of "skins" that can dramatically alter the appearance with no change in the functionality or the number and operation of the controls. However, herein lies one source of difficulty: Hassenzahl was limited by the skins that were publicly available, which in turn is biased by the sort of person who decides to develop a new skin and post them to the Sonique Web site. In October 2004, close to 500 skins were available. Hassenzahl looked at 20 skins but when he collected ratings, 8 were judged to be ugly, 11 to be neutral, and only 1 was judged to be beautiful. Moreover, the absolute value of the beauty rating (0.9) was quite less than that of the most ugly rating (2.1). Given this skewed sample, with only one skin judged to be beautiful (and not very beautiful at that), how general are these results?
In 1973, Herb Clark detected a methodological flaw in psycholinguistic studies. Experimenters would select a group of words from the lexicon that fit some previously defined criterion and use them as stimuli for their experiments. But then, in analyzing their results, they would assume the words were fixed effects and average their results over trials and experimental subjects. Clark demonstrated that because the words were samples from the entire lexicon, this analysis was inappropriate. If one wishes to generalize the conclusion of a study to all words, then the words under study must be considered to be random variables, just as are the people being studied. Clark's article is now a classic required reading for students in courses on statistics and experimental design within psychology.
One reviewer, Andrew Monk (this issue), believes that the same critique applies to Hassenzahl's study. After all, Hassenzahl (this issue) studied a sample of possible designs for the skins of his music players, not all possible designs, and so his results are subject to the same concerns pointed out by Clark (1973) in studies of psycholinguistics. The issues here are subtle, worthy of more study and discussion. However, the design constraints are very different in the analysis of language than in possible designs. Hassenzahl does not agree that Clark's argument applies to his study. The issue is important. Now that it has been raised, I am sure it will be the subject of several more debates before we get the issues straight.
I believe that the discussions within this set of articles raise critical issues for our profession. We must move beyond products that perform well toward products that deliver pleasure, beauty, and fun. But to do so, we need to understand these concepts. We lack good theoretical and empirical tools and it is only through continued discussions of the sort collected here that we can make progress.
These articles do not settle the issue; if anything, they add to the complexity. You may find yourself disagreeing with some of the viewpoints and the responses. That is good. I, as editor, am certainly not in agreement with all that is present here, nor am I convinced that all the critiques have been answered. But that is why we have presented them together, in one place: you must be the final judge. The most fruitful way to contribute to the discussion is by doing good science. Think about the articles and make your own observations. Question and critique the studies, then replicate and extend them. The scientific method, with its insistence on replication, extension, and debate, will provide the data for further theoretical elaboration, further experiments, and continuing enhancement of our understanding of these all-important concepts.
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